From Psychoanalytical Notebooks 3, 1999 : Love
THE
SCENE BY THE LAKE:
Véronique
Voruz
At the beginning of last year, the
Clinical Seminar decided to focus on Dora, the case-study Freud elected to
put forward as the paradigm of hysteria. The proposed objective was to
desimaginarise Dora’s case by stripping its logical articulations bare,
and this with the aim of re-thinking hysteria today, for indeed the
modifications that have taken place over the last century regarding the
configuration of familial and social structures have had a crucial impact
on the question of femininity. The link between femininity and hysteria
being well established in analytic practice, it seemed logical to see
whether Freud’s case could sill be of any use beyond its seminal status
and provide us with an orientation regarding today’s often more diffuse
symptoms. We thus decided to study the case of Dora with close scrutiny in
order to see whether we could identify the real of a structure subtending
the otherwise seemingly irrational phenomenology of a whimsical hysteric.
In other words, if one could use Freud’s case for the purpose of
locating the specific mode of response of the real to castration at play
in hysteria, it would then be possible to extract the invariants of a
clinical structure from her case and use it in our approach to a feminine
clinic.
It was
thus with the aim of delineating the co-ordinates of hysteria that we, in
turn, took up the task of exposing the frame of Dora’s symptom, a frame
concealed by a number of identifications. In brief, for this has been
previously explored, let us recall that in Seminar
IV, Lacan maps Dora’s identifications onto schema L. Following this
schema, her position is defined through the tension supporting her
identifications: Herr K. and Dora are on the imaginary axis, that of the
ego, and Frau K. and Dora’s father occupy the symbolic one, that of
desire.
Dora’s
behaviour can only be understood in the light of this ‘quartered’
position. With this in mind, we can now approach the pivotal point of the
case, Herr K.’s proposal by the lake, for it is at this point that
Dora’s attitude undergoes a radical change, a change which points to a
modification in the organisation of her identifications,since the pattern
mapped onto Schema L is what supported Dora’s love scenario until then.
Cutting
through the efflorescence of mundane details, Lacan’s sustained
engagement with the case demonstrates that Dora used these identifications
in order to block the anguish
provoked by the absence of a signifier for the woman in the unconscious.
Lacan indicates that her position was largely animated by a will to secure
unconditional love, love as the impossible gift, for it famously involves
‘giving what one does not have’ (Seminars
III and IV). It is also
clear that Dora engaged upon her quest for love under the cover of her identification with her father’s object of desire,
Frau K. It is when she is confronted with the real of a sexual demand that
she is brought back to her own jouissance,
which was until then comfortably channelled by the dynamics of her
identifications, for when Herr K. makes his ill-fated proposal, she is
brutally exposed: Dora herself is now desired, not the other woman she
shelters behind. The question of her own femininity can no longer be
deferred, and anguish ensues. Thus the focal point of this paper, its
vanishing point, as one could say somewhat facetiously, is this moment by
the lake when all her constructions are revealed to be precisely that,
mere constructions designed to provide a propitious background for her
personal fictions, and she is threatened with her disappearance as subject.
In this
paper then, I will elaborate upon my two immediate reactions to this
scene: firstly, that the scene by the lake had to do with anguish, and
secondly, that this anguish came about following a crucial modification
for Dora concerning her identifications.
The
Event
The
case itself is well known and I will not retrace the somewhat complicated
bonds uniting the four people who are of concern to us when thinking of
Dora. Instead, I will focus on what interests me here, in other words the
moment where something comes undone for her. Arguably, it is this moment
which provides us with a plausible key to Dora’s symptom. This is what
happens: at the age of 16, Dora is left alone by a lake with Herr K., who
begins a proposal which includes the words translated by Strachey as ‘I
get nothing from my wife’. At this point, Dora slaps him and leaves. It
is from this moment onwards that she becomes adamant that all relations
with the Ks should stop. We clearly have the triggering factor of Dora’s
rebellion and resentment against her father, a resentment which leads him
to seek Freud’s help.
Theoretical
Elements: Working Towards an Understanding of the Scene by the Lake
This
is our starting hypothesis: when Herr K. declares his passionate affection
there ensues a fall of identification for Dora, which gives rise to a
subsequent anguish. This anguish is ‘dealt with’ through a passage to
the act, followed by a regression to the stage of a demand for pure love
addressed to her father, a demand no
longer mediated by the metonymy of desire.
Our
question is thus two-fold: firstly, why does Herr K.’s declaration
provoke this fall of identification? And secondly, what is the mechanism
of anguish? But first, let us return to our starting elements.
1)
The
fall of identification:
It
is clear from Freud’s account of the scene that Dora is very upset by
Herr K.’s statement, an alternative translation for which is ‘on the
side of my wife, there is nothing’: Ich
habe nichts an meiner Frau. This possible translation is pointed out
by Lacan (Sem. IV,p. 143). Schematically, on the basis of Lacan’s
elaborations at this stage of his teaching, we may conclude that Dora
could only sustain herself as subject by identifying with Frau K, who is
the object of desire for both her father and Herr K., and that she thus
could not bear to see this woman debased. Or, in a slightly different
perspective, we could say that Frau K., at this point, no longer shields
Dora from the real of sexuality and that Dora is thus awakened from her
fantasmatic slumber. For now, let us simply note that Dora’s position
with regard to her central identification is deeply shaken.
2)
The regression to the stage of demand
This
second assertion stems from a phenomenological observation of the change
occurring in Dora’s attitude with regard to her father’s love affair
with Frau K. Before the scene, she was tolerating and even enjoying it, as
she could find a position for herself in their relation by deluding
herself that she was essential to their love. Afterwards, Dora demands
that the relation stops and that the absolute love of her father be
exclusively addressed to her. Here we can recall Lacan’s comment in Seminar
V (p. 369) regarding hysterical identification: when the father is
simply the addressee of the demand for love, then the hysterical subject
is identified with the father. We can thus imagine that following the
scene by the lake, Dora reverts to an identification with her father,
short-circuiting a desire which only came into the equation through the
mediating function of the other woman. Dora then starts to behave as if
her father had wronged her, and requires reparation, giving us a perfect
example of feminine ressentiment.
3)
The subsequent anguish resolved through the passage to the act
In
Seminar X, Lacan postulates that Dora’s slap is a passage to the
act: in the sessions of 16 and 23 January 1963, he opposes acting out and passage to the
act, relying on two Freudian cases, that of the young homosexual woman
and that of Dora. Lacan defines acting out as the monstration of an object, and passage to the act as an attempt to
restore the subject who has been
barred by the presence of an object. Dora’s passage to the act is
less dramatic than the young homosexual’s, no doubt, but it participates
of the same mechanism, a mechanism which is elucidated in the course of
the seminar.
Previously,
in the first session of the same seminar, Lacan had introduced the
following table in order to organise Freud's text Inhibitions,
Symptoms and Anxiety. In
this table, he situates passage to the act as the last resort of the
subject against anguish:
The
link between anguish and passage to the act is clearly established by
Lacan. If we are to concentrate on the event which concerns us here, it is
the third column which interest us, and it may be understood as such: when
embarrassed by the presence of
an object, the subject is barred Lacan remarks
that embarrassment resonates with bar.
In the
session of 9 January 1963, he gives us another very important clue to
understand anguish: contrary to Freud’s claim that anguish is without an
object, he says that anguish is not without having an object, or, in
French, l’angoisse n’est pas
sans objet. This ambiguous formulation immediately indicates that
anguish has to do with a drive-object, as indeed if it was any other
object, Lacan would not say that anguish is not
without having an object. It is only the specific status of object a that allows for such a formulation - bearing in mind that it is
the fantasy that transforms a drive-object into an object of desire. Thus,
if we are to combine Lacan’s table and his statement as to the object of
anguish, we may postulate that where there is a passage to the act, it
comes as a result of an encounter with a drive-object, an encounter not
filtered by desire - in other words, clothed in the imaginary scenario of
the fantasy - and therefore causing anguish, the anguish of vanishing in
the face of the certainty of the jouissance
attributed to the Other.
I hope
to have demonstrated the well-founded nature of the elements I started my
reflection from. I shall list them again as they are my working
hypothesis: Herr K.’s declaration produces a fall of identification in
Dora, resulting in an upsurge of anguish. She resolves this anguish by
slapping Herr K., the passage to the act, regresses to an anterior
identification with her father, and subsequently demands absolute love.
From this hypothesis, we can now try to work out what happened to Dora at
this moment, beginning with the question of the fall of identification.
Demand
and Desire
In
Chapter XX of Seminar V, The Formations of the Unconscious, the seminar in which Lacan
constructs his graph of desire, we find a thorough elaboration of the
relation between demand and desire. It is in this chapter that Lacan
argues that it is in so far as Dora can desire
beyond demand that she is content with her position in her father’s
affair. Indeed, she does not identify with her father but with her
father’s object of desire. (This can be seen to prefigure Lacan’s
later concept of père-version).
Let us retrace the argument. Lacan states that in neurosis the ego-Ideal -
the identification noted I(A)
on the graph - is produced after the double crossing of the line of the
Other: s(A)
- A. He then moves on to situate Dora’s central
identification on the graph of desire, saying that such is also the case
for her, but he adds that in her case, and for all hysterics, the second
line ($ à
a
-
d) represents the desire
of the father, and that for Dora, it is after the double crossing of those two lines that her identification is
constituted. The logical consequence of this assertion is that the ideal
identification of the hysteric is precipitated in the place of the fantasy, a fantasy that bears the mark of the
desire of the father (p. 368).
Thus
the hysteric identifies with the object of desire of the Other of love,
and hence is stuck in the position of the object, a position through which
she can obtain a sense of being since
it is the support of her central identification - but at the price of
a drastic alienation. In other words, Dora’s identification with her
father is not an imaginary identification but an identification with his
desire. This is why we can say that Dora’s object of desire is Frau K.,
in as much as she desires what is beyond demand. But what she truly needs
to be able to desire is to be the object of desire of the Other of love
- classically the father-
, and not the object of his demand. Dora’s situation is ‘ideal’ in a
sense, for her father is impotent. She can delude herself into believing
that his attachment for Frau K. is sustained by a pure desire beyond
demand and sexual satisfaction. She thus identifies with this woman,
object of pure desire of her father, and she does so by identifying with
Herr K., not just anybody but a man who, in her mind, also desires this
object of pure desire, his wife. By identifying with Herr K., at the level
of the imaginary, she can also desire Frau K. while also seeing herself as
being desired in the same way that Frau K. is by her father. When Herr K.
makes his hapless declaration, he annihilates the dimension of desire for
Dora, who is thus returned to the status of sexual object for Herr K.,
assimilated to the previous object of his sexual favours, the dismissed
governess (hence the importance of 15 for her, the notice period of the
governess being a fortnight). This also implies that her father is
treating her as an object of exchange, an offering of sorts to the cheated
husband. She is no longer a special, precious object of love and pure
desire, but merely a woman amongst others, equal to others, and thus in
the field of sexuality.
More
theoretically, if she cannot sustain herself in the position of the Ideal,
what does that mean? Is the Ideal for a woman equivalent to being the
object of the paternal fantasy? And why is her reaction anguish, not anger
or fear? On this latter point, I will venture a hypothesis: the forced
re-introduction of sexuality in Dora’s life undermines her fantasy,
through which she enjoys on the side of privation. The irruption of
something real, no longer veiled by the Ideal, shatters her fantasy, and the
fantasy is the support of desire, as Lacan tells us in Seminar
X (16 January 1963). If the fantasy collapses, so does desire. When
desire collapses, the object becomes present, the object of the Other’s
demand, which indicates the certainty of jouissance.
And we can start to see more clearly now that desire is a defence against jouissance,
in that it introduces a significant distance between the subject and the
object. Desire and anguish occupy positions of eclipse in relation to each
other: when desire is present, anguish is not, and conversely. Thus, the
disappearance of the possibility of desire for Dora gives rise to anguish.
This is what the fall of identification renders apparent in the scene by
the lake.
To
clarify, let me summarise the argument: before the scene by the lake, Dora
is supported by a successful ideal identification sustained by positioning
herself as the object of desire of her father. At the level of the
fantasy, she can thus see herself as a loved object beyond demand, and can
thus sustain her own desire, even if only as unsatisfied. With the
disappearance of desire, she becomes the object of the Other’s jouissance,
and disappears as subject. By slapping Herr K, she regains some sense of
subjectivity, although it is one that is deprived of the metonymical
dimension of desire and indexed on a stagnating demand for love.
Anguish
and Desire: Approaching Jouissance
Now
that we have gone through this hypothetical account of what caused
Dora’s anguish, let us broach the second aspect of my question: what is
the mechanism of anguish? It is clear, from what we have elaborated so
far, that since desire is what keeps anguish at bay, and since fantasy is
the support of desire, then the fall of identification must have had a
clear impact on Dora’s fantasy. Her failure to incarnate the Other’s
object of desire shatters her fantasy, and anguish comes on the scene.
What is
the function of anguish? We know that despite his somewhat fluctuating
views as to the economic nature of anxiety - Strachey’s translation of
the German Angst - Freud
consistently saw it as a signal, indicating that some new psychical action
needed to be carried out in order to restore homeostasis. Lacan did not
depart from this view. We also know that Freud associated the feeling of
anxiety in women to the loss of the object’s love (Inhibitions,
Symptoms and Anxiety). It seems that, in Dora’s case, it is losing
the love obtained by means of the fantasy that allows for the return of
the object which generates her anguish, the dual function of the object
being stressed by Lacan.
1)
Anguish and the object
In
Seminars IX and X Lacan
uses the parable of the praying mantis to illustrate the functioning of
anguish. The parable is the following: when you see a praying mantis, and
you don’t know whether you are wearing a male or a female mask, anguish
sets in because you don’t know
what fate is to be expected from the praying mantis. Thus we can
understand why it is possible to say that the enigma of the desire of the
Other gives rise to anguish, and we can also understand why the neurotic
is constantly constructing the demand of the Other: to eradicate
the dimension of uncertainty
as to the Other’s jouissance.
Initially, I experienced some difficulty in reconciling
this first aspect of the parable, with its emphasis on the enigmatic
Other, with Lacan’s insistence that anguish is not
without an object. However, upon reflection it became clear to me that
Lacan’s parable concerns the vacillation of the neurotic before the
certainty of his relation to jouissance.
Thus the parable could also be understood as follows: if I know for a fact
that I am wearing the male mask, then anguish is at its worse because then
I am certain that I am the object
of the Other’s jouissance.
This certainty annihilates me as subject, for it does away with the
dimension of desire, and it is desire which defers jouissance,
that which the neurotic cannot bear. Indeed, as Lacan tells us in Seminar X, the neurotic refuses
to sacrifice his castration to the jouissance of the Other. This
refusal leads the neurotic to construct the other through his fantasy,
itself designed to desire despite alienation in the Other (hence the
correspondence between fantasy and the operation of separation). In
passing, this casts some light on why the only satisfactory end of
analysis should involve the exposure of the inexistence of the Other, in
other words, the exposure of the fact that the jouissance
one fears and one defends oneself against at great expense is attributed
to an Other which is in fact tirelessly constructed by the subject
himself. Having exposed the Other as fiction, one can then begin to
address the question of the superego, that ‘little bit of the real’
that can no longer be displaced onto the Other. Equally, it helps us to
understand why a traversal of the fantasy may be necessary in order to
reduce the superegoic effects experienced by the subject.
Meanwhile,
as long as the subject is still lured on by the charms of symptomatic
truth, his/her only option is to keep his/her desire as either impossible
or unsatisfied, for satisfaction would annihilate the effect of separation
achieved through the fantasy. This leads me to my next section, broaching
the question of desire in hysteria.
2) Unsatisfied desire
Desire
thus is what keeps the identification with the object of the Other’s jouissance at a reasonable distance through the mediation of love
achieved by means of the fantasy. The price to pay for this distance
however is the impossibility of satisfying one’s desire. And indeed, in
analysing the dream of the Butcher’s wife, Freud discovers that the
hysteric’s desire is for an unsatisfied desire, that there is thus a
desire for privation in hysteria. One can therefore argue that the
‘enjoyment’ derived from privation is the substitutive mode of
satisfaction of the hysteric.
The
hysteric sustains her desire as unsatisfied by taking an interest in the
desire of the Other. The Butcher’s wife is interested in the enigmatic
desire of her husband for her thin friend, when he usually likes
voluptuous women. She is not interested in what satisfies
him, but in what he desires.
This clearly indicates that the hysteric is interested in the Other’s
lack. Why? Because her question concerns her being
as subject, a being she obtains through the Other. This is where Lacan
provides us with an answer as to what the hysteric’s desire is: it is to
be the signifier of the Other’s
desire - the phallus (F),
not the object of his satisfaction.
This explains why ‘being the phallus’ is a possible feminine position.
If
we recall Dora’s ‘quartered’ position on Schema L, we can understand
it in the light of how she constructs and sustains her desire. Firstly, at
the level of the ego, she identifies with an imaginary other, an identification which provides her with a support
for her investigation of the desire of the Other. Secondly, she desires
what the Other of love desires, for she can only desire through an
identification with a desiring position. It allows her to explore what is
it that a woman wants. Thirdly, at the level of being, she identifies with
the object of desire of the Other, a position termed being the phallus by Lacan. This provides her with an answer to the
question of what it is that a man wants from a woman.
3)
Passage to the act as resolution
When
the hysteric fails to sustain herself as desirable, she can no longer
desire. She is then faced with the certainty of being the object of the
Other’s satisfaction, a certainty which manifests itself by a kind of
paralysis (here we can recall the two axes of Lacan’s table: movement
— difficulty). How does Dora’s slap constitute a resolution of the
trauma of being effaced as subject? In Seminar X (19 December 1963), Lacan tells us that what is at stake
for the subject ‘is to avoid what, in anguish, is sustained by a
terrible certainty’, and adds that ‘to act is to tear certainty away
from anguish’. Further, he also says that ‘it may precisely be from
anguish that action borrows its certainty.’
These quotes illustrate how a passage to the act, in so
far as it is an act, takes away the certainty that fuels anguish while
transforming it into the certainty that informs the act: thus, when Dora
slaps Herr K., she alleviates her anguish (this is not to say that a
passage to the act is the only possible act in the face of anguish) and
re-constitutes herself as subject through the certainty of action. Most
passages to the act however, as they aim at getting rid of the object with
which the subject is identified, end up in more dramatic circumstances,
suicide being the most frequent occurrence.
Now
that it is possible to grasp some of the motives underlying Dora’s
attitude, I will concentrate on two broader points regarding hysterical
strategies in general. These struck me in the course of my work on Dora:
first, the prevalence of privation as mode of feminine jouissance,
secondly, the tight bond attaching the hysteric’s fate to that of the
master, whom she constantly challenges but cannot do without
Privation
as Mode of Jouissance
In
Seminar XVII, L’envers de la
psychanalyse, Lacan returns once more to Dora, this time to talk about
the truth of the hysteric.
Lacan’s angle on truth touches more directly on the question of jouissance, for truth is a symptomatic production the function of
which is to consolidate the subject’s belief
in his symptom qua signified of
the Other, and thus designed to preserve the enjoyment one derives from
one’s castration.
What is
the hysteric’s truth, a truth that draws her always further into the
entangled webs of her fantasmatic interpretations and re-interpretations
of the Other’s desire? From our earlier developments, it is clear that
the hysteric obtains some sense of her own being by being what the Other
lacks; she strives to be at the same time the object of the Other’s desire
and the signifier of his lack.
Hence the logic of the hysteric who slips away as object, a logic noted by
Lacan in his 'Ecrit:
Subversion of
the subject’. She wants to be the phallus, the signifier of desire,
not the object of satisfaction of this desire. It is always a close call
for her to be able to incarnate the object of desire, then get out of
delivering the promised satisfaction, and yet manage to retain the
master’s desire.
At
the level of being, as the hysteric can only exist if the Other is
lacking, she will concentrate her efforts towards exposing the
Other/master as castrated. This is her truth: the castration of the master. To expose this lack in the Other, the
hysteric will give up on her own jouissance,
this is why it is possible to say that desire for privation is the
condition of the hysteric’s desire. Here we may have another angle on
the scene by the lake. Herr K. is for Dora someone that can bring
satisfaction to her sexual desire, he is what has been called a quart
terme phallique, a bearer of the organ. But Lacan indicates that desire
for privation is what interests Dora in Herr K., thus the fact that he has
the means to satisfy her sexually is important, but only in so far as
another woman deprives her of
it. Lacan derives this interpretation from Dora’s first dream, that of
the jewel case: what interests her is not the jewel, but the case. This is
what she enjoys, says Lacan (Seminar XVII, p. 109).
Dora’s
second dream, the one about the death of her father, is also a dream that
has to do with emptiness: it takes place mostly in a deserted flat, in
which she finds a substitute for her father, a big book. This dream
reveals another aspect of her truth: what she wants from him is the
knowledge that he can produce, a knowledge on the sexual relation - Dora
used to read the Encyclopaedia to find out about sex -, and this is why
she supports him against all odds.
The
truth of the hysteric is thus two-fold: on the one hand, the castration of
the idealised father, which reveals the secret of the master, and, on the
other, privation, that is the acceptance by the subject of the
substitutive satisfaction of being deprived. With this in mind, we can try
to understand the logic behind the discourse of the hysteric.
The
Hysteric’s Discourse
The
formula of the hysteric’s discourse is well known, it illustrates that
the hysteric speaks from the place of her division in order to make the
master produce a knowledge about the sexual relation.
$
®
S1
a
S2
We
know that, for Lacan, a discourse is a form of social bond. In Seminar XVIII, he also tells us that the discourse of the master is
the discourse of the unconscious. We can understand such a statement in so
far as the unconscious is structured like a language, according to the
elementary signifiers of kinship. It aims at saying what is, or, as Lacan says in Seminar
XX, le discours du maître
c’est le discours du m’être (p. 33). It is in that sense that the
S2 is the slave signifier of the S1 in the discourse of the master:
knowledge is put to work in order to sustain the master-signifiers in
their position.
S1
®
S2
$
a
The
discourse of the hysteric, on the other hand, interrogates the repressed
or, in other words, the unconscious constituted of master-signifiers. The
split subject of the unconscious interrogates the master-signifiers and
reveals the castration of the master, i.e. that mastery
over the body only obtains through a renunciation of jouissance. And
indeed in the discourse of the master, the plus-de-jouir
is on the side of the slave.
In Seminar
XVII, Lacan says that the hysteric reveals the truth of the master,
i.e. the impotence of man to animate his knowledge with a plus-de-jouir.
But the problem of the hysteric is also one of impotence, for what is
repressed in hysteria returns in the body or in the Other. This is why the
hysteric addresses the Other to get knowledge. This is also why she is
dissociated from knowledge and cannot invest it with jouissance:
in the discourse of the hysteric the plus-de-jouir
is on the side of the repressed truth. This may be why her jouissance is on the side of privation.
But,
as opposed to the master, the hysteric refuses to be the slave of the
master-signifier. She refuses to become one through the signifier, she
refuses to makes herself its body, de s’en faire le corps, as the master does. The master acquires
mastery over his body through the signifier, the hysteric refuses this
one-fying power of the master-signifier. This may be why she is so
dependant on her identifications, for she places her being in the Other.
In a sense though, the hysteric reveals a truth that goes for all
subjects, i.e. that the subject only
exists as masked, as the subject is not where it is represented, and
conversely.
Conclusion
I
hope that these various elaborations on hysteria will cast some light on
Lacan’s later work, where the questions of femininity and love are
prevalent and where Lacan formalises the idea of the pas-toute
as that which of the real is irreducible to the phallic order. Femininity,
the Other jouissance, are
presented as that which goes beyond the dimension of the one-fying
signifier. Jacques-Alain Miller clearly signposts the necessity to think
the real in connection with the question of femininity in his paper On
Semblants, when he says that woman is closer to the real than man, and
that it is men who are in the position of semblants. He defines a semblant as that which veils the nothing and thereby
creates it as absent. Knowing that the phallus is a semblant, this may
start to make sense.
In his paper, Miller concludes his elaboration on the
feminine semblants of having and
being by opposing phallic jouissance - the jouissance
of the owner - to the
without-limit of the feminine. This seems to point us in the direction of
the central debate currently surrounding the end of analysis and the pass,
for where a ‘masculine’ solution seems to involve an identification
with the symptom - a solution favoured by Lacan in his Seminar
XXIV - and thus, in the last analysis, with a meaningless inscription
of jouissance, a ‘feminine’
solution seems to imply a different relation to lack, an acceptance of the
absence of unification, or one-ification, under the auspices of the signifier. This certainly
leaves us with a lot to think about in terms of the real at the end of
analysis and the position of the analyst. Are we simply talking about the
persistence of one’s elected mode of enjoyment, i.e. is the feminine
predilection for a desire that finds its source in S(A) simply a
consequence of a mode of jouissance
on the side of privation?
Copyright © Véronique Voruz 2003. This text from the website of the London Society of the NLS, at http://www.londonsociety-nls.org.uk. Permission to use material from this site must be sought from the LS-NLS. All rights reserved. Please include this portion of the text in any printed version of this paper.